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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM K. HOWARD, RUTH N.
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD
and SHIRLEY L. HOWARD,
Plaintiffs, and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
9223

MILDRED M. HOWARD and WALKER
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, as administrator of the estate of L. W.
HOWARD, Deceased,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action is one brought by plaintiffs under the provisions of Chapter 33 of Title 78, Utah Code Annotated, to
obtain a declaratory judgment, determining and declaring
that a certain judgment, entered July 9, 1958 in Civil Action
No. 108689 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, between the same parties,
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became and is a final judgment and degree, and that a certain
"Notice of Intention to Move for a New Trial" filed in said
proceeding, after entry of said judgment, is a legal nullity
and did not stay the running of the time for appeal from the
judgment referred to. In order to obtain a proper understanding of this case, it therefore becomes necessary to review
briefly the case out of which the present action arose, to-wit:
said Civil No. 108689, above referred to.
L. W. Howard, whose full name was Lucas William
Howard, died intestate in Salt Lake City, Utah, N ovemher
30, 1955. The day following the death of L. W. Howard,
defendant Mildred M. Howard placed of record in the office ·
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, a purported warranty deed bearing date of May 9, 1945, which
instrument is now of record in the office of the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, in Book 1263, page 45,
photostat copy of which as it appears on the the County records is hereto attached as Exhibit A.
Action was brought by the plaintiffs Wm. K. Howard,
Ruth N. Howard, Robert D. Howard, and Shirley L. Howard,
children of the decedent, to have said instrument declared
and adjudged to be null and void and of no effect. This
case was designated Civil No. 108689. This action resulted
in a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant, dated July 9, 1958, (Record 33-35) under which the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
Utah, decreed said purported deed above referred to to be
null and void and of no effect. Certified copy of said
judgment is contained in the record on appeal. (Record
33-35) Said judgment was a judgment on the pleadings,
based upon the fact that the description in said instrument
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3
did not enclose any tract of land and did not contain words
showing that the description was intended to go to the place
of beginning, but rather it ended at a point two courses
away from the point of beginning. No appeal from said
judgment of July 9, 1958 was filed and it is the contention
of plaintiffs that said judgment became and is a final
judgment and decree, binding upon the defendants herein
as to matters adjudged and decreed therein. Thereafter, on
July 14, 1958, the attorneys for defendant Mildred M. Howard served upon plaintiffs and filed with the court in said
civil No. 108689 a document entitled "Notice of Intention to
Move for New Trial." (Record 36) Said "Notice of
Intention to Move for New Trial" did not specify any time
nor place for the hearing thereof nor for the hearing of the
motion intended to be made, nor did it recite with particularity the grounds therefor, as required by Rule 7 (b) (I)
and defendants did not, with said document, file a notice
of the hearing thereof, as required by Rule 6 (d) of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, and no notice of the hearing of said document was served therewith, nor has any such notice been
since served upon plaintiffs.
After the lapse of a considerable period of time, to-wit:
more than fifteen months, during which time the defendant
Walker Bank & Trust Co. as administrator of the estate of
L. W. Howard, deceased, took no action to close the estate,
plaintiffs demanded of said Walker Bank & Trust Co.,
as administrator, that they distribute the estate of L. W.
Howard, deceased, and distribute to plaintiffs their share
of the assets in said estate; that defendant Walker Bank
& Trust Co. thereeupon declined so to do, stating that they
were unable to determine the finality of the said judgment of
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July 9, 1958 (Record 33-35) because they did not know
the legal effect of the instrument filed entitled "Notice of
Intention to Move for New Trial." (Record 36) Upon
refusal of the bank to effect distribution plaintiffs brought
this action, under the provisions of the declaratory judgment
statute, to obtain a judgment and decree declaring the said
"Notice of Intention to Move for New Trial" to be a legal
nullity and declaring the judgment entered July 9, 1958 in
Civil No. 108689, to be a final judgment and degree.
This action for a declaratory judgment was designated
by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, wherein it was filed, as Civil No. 123132. In
said action both parties moved for summary judgment and
on March 9, 1960 the court denied plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment and granted defendant Mildred Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissed the
case as "no cause for action." (Record 32) The court then
went on further and made a purported finding that the instrument designated as a. "Notice of Intent to move for a new
trial" in case No. 108689 is valid and the time for appeal
has not expired. It is from this summary judgment of March
9, 1960, (Record 32) that this appeal is taken.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Plaintiffs base their appeal upon the following five
points, wherein it is alleged that the court erred, to-wit:
I. THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL ON MOTION.
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2. THE JUDGMENT MADE AND ENTERED BY
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT ON THE 9th DAY OF
JULY, 1858 IN CIVIL NO. 108689, DOCKETED IN DOCKET 63, PAGE 1709, BECAME AND IS A FINAL JUDGMENT, BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF THE
DEFENDANTS TO APPEAL FROM SAID JUDGMENT
WITHIN THE TIME PROVIDED BY LAW.
3. DOCUMENT FILED BY DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL
NO. 108689 ENTITLED "NOTICE OF INTENTION TO
MOVE FOR A NEW TRIAL" DID NOT COMPLY WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 6, 7, AND 59 OF THE
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND DID NOT THEREFORE SUSPEND THE RUNNING OF TIME FOR APPEAL.
4. FAlLURE OF THE DEFENDANTS TO CALL UP
FOR HEARING, FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN ONE
YEAR, THEIR "NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MOVE FOR
A NEW TRIAL" CONSTITUTED AN ABANDONMENT OF
THE MOTION.
5. THE PURPORTED FINDING OF THE COURT
IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED MARCH 9, 1960,
IN CIVIL NO. 123132 (RECORD 32) THAT THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN CASE NO. 108689 IS VALID
AND THE TIME FOR APPEAL HAS NOT EXPIRED, IS
NULL AND VOID, FOR THE REASON THAT CASE NO.
123132 HAVING BEEN DISMISSED, THERE IS NOTHING BEFORE THE COURT ON WHICH IT CAN BASE A
FINDING THAT THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, SO1
CALLED, IS VALID.
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ARGUMENT
Point I. THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF
ACTION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL ON
MOTION.
In dismissing plaintiffs' complaint as "no cause for
action" the court has dealt with defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (Record 7) as if it were a motion for
dismissal. It is a well recognized rule of law that as
against a motion for dismissal all well pleaded facts are
to be considered as true. Thus it becomes necessary for the
appellate court to review plaintiffs' complaint (Record 1-3)
and determine therefrom whether action for declaratory judgment lies and whether the essentials to such an action are
adequately pleaded. Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Chapter 33 of Title 78, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
establish the requirements for declaratory judgment action. Rule 57 provides, inter alia, "The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for
declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate." There
are numerous cases which hold that an action for declaratory judgment lies where there is uncertainty as to the
application of a judgment or the interpretation thereof,
or where, as here there is controversy as to whether or not
judgment has become final and binding. The rule is set
forth in 154 ALR 745, as follows:
"There is substantial authority for the proposition
that a real and substantial controversy over the
validity or effect of a judgment may present a ground
for relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act."
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Our Rule 57 is substantially the same as the federal
rule, bearing the same number, and thus what is set forth
in ALR as to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act applies
with equal force to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. ALR
cites numerous cases in support of the rule of law, as stated.
There are also a great many decisions of state courts to
the same effect. For example:
Bowan v. Belyeu 51 So. 2nd 27 where a declaratory
judgment was held proper to determine whether a judgment
was a personal judgment against a certain individual;
Connecticut Savings Bank v. First National Bank,
51A907 which held that a declaratory judgment was proper
to declare the effect of and explain judicial decrees;
National Ben Franklin Life v. Camden Trust Co. 115 A
2nd 589 which held that a court can entertain a declaratory
action to determine the significance and effect of a judgment;
Stavros v. Bradley 232 SW 2nd 104, which upheld a
declaratory action for the purpose of construing a judgment
where the parties did not know how to proceed thereunder
or how the judgment affected them.
If declaratory judgment is proper, then the next question is whether or not plaintiffs' complaint on file herein
(Record 1-3) states a cause of action upon which decla~a
tory judgment could be based. In brief, the complaint
alleges the existence of the controversy, in Civil No. 108689,
the entry of judgment therein, the failure of the defendants
therein to appeal therefrom, the service of the so-called
"Notice of Intention to Move for New Trial," the alleged
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abandonment of the said "Notice of Intention to Move for
New Trial," the request made to defendant Walker Bank &
Trust Co., as administrator, to proceed with the probating
of the estate of L. W. Howard, deceased, and their refusal to
do so, upon the grounds that they did not comprehend the
legal effect· on the judgment of said "Notice of Intention to
Move for New Trial." Certainly this sets forth facts and
grounds sufficie!lt to justify relief under the Declaratory
Judgment Act. The defendant, by her refusal to concede that
the judgment of July 9, 1958 is a final judgment, creates the
facts which compel the plaintiffs to bring this action to
resolve the controversy as to whether or not the judgment in
Civil No. 108689 is final. It is respectfully submitted that
plaintiffs' complaint sets forth a cause of action for declaratory judgment and even though there might be other remedies
available to plaintiffs, under the provision of Rule 57 a
declaratory judgment proceeding is proper, and the essential facts having been properly pleaded the court was without justification in summarily dismissing plaintiffs' complaint.
Point 2. THE JUDGMENT MADE AND ENTERED BY
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT ON THE 9th DAY OF
JULY, 1958,1N CIVIL NO. 108689, DOCKETED IN DOCKET 63, PAGE 1709, BECAME AND IS A FINAL JUDGMENT BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF THE
DEFENDANTS To· APPEAL FROM SUCH JUDGMENT
IN THE TIME PROVIDED BY LAW.
Little need be said· about this point. Rule 73 o£ the
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an appeal shall be
taken within one month from. the eritry of the judgment,
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with certain exceptions. The running of the time for appeal
is terminated by a timely motion, made pursuant to the rules.
It is plaintiffs' contention that the instrument filed by defendant Mildred M. Howard did not constitute such a motion
and was therefore legally insufficient to stay the running
of the time for appeal. Whether or not the instrument filed
by defendant Mildred M. Howard in Civil No. 108689 was
sufficient to terminate the running of the time of appeal,
will be discussed under Point 3 herein. In the event said
instrument is not legally sufficient, then definitely the time
for appeal has long since expired and by such expiration the
judgment of July 9, 1958 in Civil No. 108689 has become
and is final and binding upon the parties hereto.
Point 3. DOCUMENT FILED BY DEFENDANTS 1n
CIVIL NO. 108689 ENTITLED "NOTICE OF INTENTION
TO MOVE FOR A NEW TRIAL" DID NOT COMPLY
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 6, 7, and 59 OF
THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND DID NOT
THEREFORE SUSPEND THE RUNNING OF THE TIME
FOR APPEAL.
This point goes directly to the heart of the present controversy. If the document filed by defendants entitled
"Notice of Intention to Move for a New Trial" (Record 36)
was legally sufficient to stay the running of the time for
appeal and has not been abandoned, then the action Civil
No. 108689 is still pending; but, if said instrument was not
legally sufficient to stay the running of the time for appeal,
or, in the event it was abandoned, as plaintiffs allege, then
the judgment of July 9, 1958 in Civil No. 108689 (Record
33-35) has become final and binding upon the parties hereto
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and is not subject to review. Plaintiffs contend that the
instrument entitled "Notice of Intention to Move for a New
Trial" is a legal nullity and did not stay the running of the
time for appeal, for three reasons:
lst: It does not set forth with particularity the
grounds for making an application to the court for an order,
as required by Rule 7 (b) (I).
2nd: The instrument is not a motion but a mere statement of intent.
3rd: The instrument, if it was or was intended to be
a motion, did not have appended thereto a notice of the
hearing thereof, as required by Rule 6 (d).
Rule 7 (b) (I) of the Rules of Civil Procedure reads
as follows:
"Motions. An application to the court for an order
shall be made by motion, which, unless made during
a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing; shall
state with particularity the grounds therefor; and
shall set forth the relief or order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion is
stated in a written notice of the hearing of the
motion."
Let us examine the "Notice of Intention to Move for a
New Trial." A certified copy of this document appears in
the record, (Record 36) but for the convenience of the court
in analyzing the instrument, it is deemed advisable to set
forth here the body of the instrument in order that attention
may be drawn to the component parts thereof to determine
whether or not they meet the requirements of the rules. The
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instrument is entitled "Notice of Intention to Move for a New
Trial.'' The body reads as follows:
"You and each of you will please take notice that
the defendant, Mildred M. Howard, intends to move
the above entitled court to vacate and set aside the
judgment and decision of the court rendered in the
above entitled action, and to grant a new trial of said
cause, upon the following grounds materially affecting the substantial right of said defendant, to-wit:
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court
by which defendant Mildred M. Howard was prevented from having a fair trial.
2.

The decision is against law.

Said motion with respect to the cause mentioned
in the first ground is made upon affidavit herewith
attached and served upon you and upon the minutes of the court; and in respect to the second ground
said motion is made upon the minutes of the court
and upon all of the records in this case."
The defendant, in this instrument, sets forth two
grounds based upon which she declares her intention to
move for a new trial. Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure sets forth the procedure for applying to the court
for a new trial. Subparagraph (a) of said Rule 59 sets
forth the grounds. Defendants appear to rely upon subparagraphs l and 6 of said Rule 59 (a). These two subparagraphs read as follows:

"( l) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury, or adverse party or any order of the court or
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abuse of discretion by which the party was prevented
from having a fair trial."
" ( 6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision or that it is against law."
Rule 59 (c) provides that when the application for a
new trial is made under subdivisions (I) , ( 2) , ( 3), ( 4),
shall be supported by affidavit. Inasmuch as the affidavit
attached to said Notice of Intention, is not in the record on
appeal plaintiffs deem it proper to insert it here. The body
thereof read as follows:
"Milton V. Backman, being duly sworn on oath deposes and says that he is one of the attorneys for Mildred
M. Howard, defendant herein who appeared at the pre-trial
conference on said matter. That by the Memorandum of
Points and Authorities filed herein request was made for
leave to amend defendants' cross complaint filed in said
action by interlineation by adding to paragraph 2 the words
'containing 2.75 acres, more or less.' That defendant made
known to the court in said memorandum that she was prepared to offer the testimony of C. C. Bush of the Engineering
firm of Bush & Gudgell to the effect that by his taking the
deed in question he could locate the land on the ground from
the description as contained in the deed. Such evidence
would bring. the instant case within those cases holding
that if a surveyor by applying the rules of survey can locate
the land, the description is sufficient and the deed will be
sustained.
"Defendant was entitled to amend her cross complaint
and the case should have been assigned to the trial court for
the taking of evidence."
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It is respectfully pointed out that this affidavit does
not show any "irregularity" in the proceedings of the court,
jury or adverse party or any order of the court. Neither does
it show any facts constituting an "abuse of discretion" by
which the party was prevented from having a fair trial. The
case did not depend upon a survey and it was not an irregularity nor abuse of discretion to decline a trial or testimony
of a surveyor where the fatal defect was apparent upon the
face of the deed upon which defendant relied, in that it did
not purport to enclose any tract of land and did not contain
words bringing the boundary line hack to the point of
beginning. Such words being entirely absent from the
description no surveyor could supply them. The statement
as to acreage was in the purported deed and was before the
court, but even had the amendment requested by defendants
been allowed it would not have changed the decision.
Hence it follows that the affidavit does not set forth
any facts constituting "irregularity" or "abuse of discretion." The "irregularity" or "abuse of discretion" referred
to by Rule 59 (a) is a jury verdict "the result of mistake,
passion, prejudice, or improper motive on its part or where
it is coerced by the court"; (Moores Federal Practise 2nd
Ed. Vol. 6, page 3792 notes 5 & 6 & cases cited therein), or
where the verdict is "the result of compromise," or "pure
chance" (Moore, supra, page 3794 notes 13, 14 and 15.)
Or it may mean the "misconduct of third persons toward the
jury," (Moore, supra, page 3801 note 51); These citations
illustrate the type of "irregularities" and "abuse of discretion" contemplated by Rule 59 (a) Nothing of this nature
appears in defendants' affidavit.
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A Utah case further sets forth the type of "irregularity"
referred to in the rule. It says,
"It may consist in what is termed 'packing' the
jury, or it may be by circulating papers or other documents to influence them or by extending special
courtesies to some of them, or by direct communication with one or more of their number." Paul v. Salt
Lake City R. Co. 34 U 1, 95 P. 363.
When the "irregularity" or "abuse of discretion" is
alleged on the part of the judge it must be a similar offence
against justice, and the circumstances· must be stated with
particularity. When they do not the affidavit in support of
the Motion for New Trial may be dismissed as insufficient,
as was done in Paul vs. Salt Lake City R. Co. supra.
Defendants' statement "that the decision is against law"
is likewise not legally sufficient, because it does not set forth
"with particularity" as required by the provisions of Rule
7 (b) ( l) the points relied upon. The requirements of the
rules in providing that all motions state with particularity the
grounds therefor, is clearly and thoroughly discussed in a
very recent federal case, U.S. of A vs. 64.88 acres of land
in Allegany County, Pennsylvania, decided January 27,
1960 and reported in 25 Federal Rules Decision, page 88,
wherein the court says:
"The government filed a timely motion for a
new trial. That motion is now under consideration.
Counsel have been heard at oral argument on the
merits of ·the case and have filed briefs. As trial
judge I noticed the generality of the reasons assigned
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in the government's motion for new trial. Counsel
were asked to brief the point as to whether the motion conformed to the requirements of Rule 7 (b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.
Because I do not think that the motion is in compliance with Rule 7 (b), the body of the motion is stated
in full.
'And now, to wit, this 29th day of June, 1959,
comes Hubert I. Teitelbaum, United States Attorney
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, by John
R. Gavin, First Assistant United States Attorney, and
John F. Potter, Assistant United States Attorney,
and moves your Honorable Court for a new trial in
the above entitled matter for the following reasons:
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Improper admission of testimony.
Government counsel was prejudiced.
Refusal to admit proper testimony.
Refusal to permit cross-examination.
The verdict is excessive.

'[2] It is to be noticed that Rule 7 refers to both
pleadings and motions. Seven (a) pertains to
pleadings. Seven (b) says that a motion 'shall state
with particularity the grounds therefor . . . ' (sic)
Counsel for the government concedes in his brief that
the five grounds assigned are general in nature but
he says they are 'sufficiently specific to advise the
court and opposing counsel of the theories upon
which the government sought a new triaL' I must disagree. I will agree that the fifth reason, that is that
the verdict is excessive, no doubt is sufficient in and
of itself to raise the issue as to whether the verdict
may be permitted under the evidence. However,
as to the first four reasons, I can conceive of no language which could be less particular or more brief
than the reasons assigned."
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The court then refers to the rules requiring particularity,
shows why they are just and proper. The court continues
by quoting from United States v. Kresnor D.C. 143 F Supp.
184, 196, as follows:
"I do not consider this rule to establish a mere
technical requirement but rather hold it to be 'real
and substantial.' "
The court quotes further from Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio
Pictures 16 F.R.D. 15 and Barron and Holtzoff Vol. 1, p.
405 to the effect that:
"requirements are mandatory; compliance is essential to orderly procedure."
The court also calls attention to Federal Form 19 as a
"guide or standard" and adds,
"It seems to this court that to regard the instant
motion as sufficient to raise the first four assigned
reasons is to nullify completely Rule 7 (b)."
Further, in view of an attempt to amend the motion:
"Regarding as I do the instant motion as a
nullity, no amendment of it or elaboration upon the
reasons assigned can be permitted."
This decision of the Federal Court is likewise the rule
in Utah. Our Supreme Court in a case entitled in re Application 7600, to appropriate water, 73 Utah 50, 58, 272 P.
225, states:
"As stated, there are no specifications or objections either in the motion for a new trial or in the
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assignments of error that the findings of the court
are contrary to the weight of the evidence or that they
are without support in the evidence. The notice of
motion for a new trial but says:
'that the findings of fact are not supported by
the evidence and against the evidence; that such
judgment is against the evidence and against
law.'
"No specifications wherein the evidence is insufficient to support the findings are found in the motion
for a new trial or elsewhere in the record. The insufficiency of the evidence is argued in appellants'
brief. We are left to search through the entire record
consisting of more than 455 written pages, without
any assistance from the assignments of error or from
the motion for a new trial, to ascertain wherein and
whereby the findings are contrary to the evidence.
That this court has repeatedly declined to do in the
absence of assigned errors specifying wherein the
findings are not supported by the evidence."
The Utah Supreme Court, like the United States District
Court in the case last above cited, rejected the motion for a
new trial, declaring the statements therein as not grounds
for a new trial, but "merely statements that the court erred·
in its conclusions to render judgment for respondents and in
the conclusions in denying the motion for a new trial."
Certainly that is all we have here, the bare statement
"that the decision is against law" is certainly not a statement of particularity which complies with the provisions of
Rule 7 (b) (2) and being, as the federal court stated, a
legal nullity, it did not stay the running of the time for
appeal.
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The next question is whether the document entitled
"Notice of Intention to Move for a New Trial" is a motion
at all or a mere statement of intention. Under our old rules
the provisions of Section 104-10-4 & 5, Utah Code Annotated
1943, the party intending to move for a new trial was required to first file with the court and serve upon the adverse
party a "notice of his intention" and thereafter within five
days file supporting affidavits. Section 104-40-6 provided
for hearing within 60 days thereafter. All of these sections
were repealed and the procedure was entirely changed.
Under the new rules now in effect for ten years, there is no
provision for a notice of intention and the law now requires
the filing of the actual motion itself within ten days. This
motion consists of two or sometimes three parts. First, the
request to the court for an order, which must comply with
Rule 7 (b) ( 1). Second, the notice of the hearing thereof,
required by Rule 6 (d); and Third the affidavits, if affidavits are to be used. The form of motion is set forth in the
Appendix of Forms, attached to the Rules of Civil Procedure, as Form 20, which is a modification of Federal Form 19.
The defendant in the district court argued that the
instrun1ent referred to was actually a motion, notwithstandin its title. Appellants concede that the title of an instrument is not controlling, but respectfully call to attention of
the court the wording of the body of instrument, which states
that the defendant "intends to move the above entitled court
to vacate and set aside the judgment." A statement of intention is not the doing of the act, and the courts have been
very careful to make a distinction between them. For
example, in Halliman v. Prindle 29 P 2 202 ( 205) the attorney expressed his intention of asking for a directed verdict.
The court said:
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"This statement of respondents' counsel was not a
motion for an instructed verdict. A motion is an
application for an order and counsel's statement of
what he intended to do was not an application for an
order."
It is respectfully pointed out that in defendants' Notice
of Intention there is no request for any order, but merely
a statement of defendants' intent.
We come now to the final, fatal defect, in the instrument filed by defendant. Rule 6 (d) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
"A written motion other than one which may be heard
ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof, shall be
served not later than five days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period IS
fixed by these rules or by order of the court."
By this provision the notice is made an integral part of
the motion. No one need err in respect thereto because in
Form 20 of the Appendix of Forms above referred to, the
notice of motion is made an integral part of the motion itself.
The compiler's notes to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
state, in commencing on Form 20:
"The motion and notice above may be combined
and denominated notice of motion under rule 7 (b) ;
or, it may be made separately, either as above indicated or on two pages under separate title of the court
and cause. "
No notice, as required by these rules, was attached to
the instrument, and no notice of the hearing said instrument
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has ever been served upon the plaintiffs or filed. This omission constitutes a fatal defect in the instrument, rendering it
legally insufficient to stay the running of the time for appeal.
Defendant in the lower court argued that it was .not the
practice under the old code, in effect before the new rules
were adopted, nor is it "the practice now" to give notice in
all cases. What the practice was prior to the adoption of the
present rules is wholly immaterial; neither are we bound by
what the "practice" is now if it is contrary to the rules.
There is no purpose whatever in having rules if they are not
to be followed. If the courts have power to ignore Rule 6,
then they have power to ignore all of the rules. Then we
are not governed by rules, but by what someone conceives
"the practice" to be.
The courts have been very strict in applying the rules.
The rule in question is discussed in Barron & Holzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure, Vol. 1, page 387, section 218,
which states:
"Motion, notice of hearing, and supporting affidavit,
if any, must be served not later than five days before
the time specified for the hearing, unless a different
period is fixed by the court or by the rules."
The five day period of time has been shortened in some
cases for good cause, but if a complete motion is not made,
that is, the motion, notice, and affidavit, if any, it is impossible later to amend, to file affidavits for example or to
show additional grounds. There are numerous federal cases
to this effect. This court is bound by its own decision in
Lund v. Third District Court, 62 P. 2d 278, wherein it is
determined that a motion for new trial may not, after time for
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filing motion has expired, be amended by adding new or
additional grounds not specified in the original motion.
~

If it is impossible to amend a motion by adding new
grounds, then it should also be impossible to add an essential
integral part by adding, after the expiration of the time limit,
the essential notice of hearing, which by Rule 6 and 7, above
referred to, and by Form 20, is a part of the very motion
itself.
Point 4. FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANTS TO CALL
UP FOR HEARING FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN
ONE YEAR THEIR NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MOVE
FOR A NEW TRIAL CONSTITUTES AN ABANDONMENT OF THE MOTION.
The purpose of the rules above· referred to and the
strictness with which they have been applied, is for a salutory purpose, to-wit: the termination of litigation. A final
judgment is a termination to an action and is intended to
settle the controversy. If the losing party is not satisfied
therewith there is a right, first of all, to move for amendment or new trial within ten days, and a right to appeal
within thirty days. If these remedies are not followed, then
the judgment is final, and its finality is binding not only
on the parties but on the court, both district and supreme;
and it is to support this finality that the rules are as strict as
they are. Now, when judgment was entered against the defendants on July 9, 1958, the matter so far as the plaintiffs were
concerned, was determined. Plaintiffs had received what
they requested and had no duty to go forward. The defendants had
right to move for a new trial or to appeal. It is
.

.

the
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conceded that it is obvious that at first defendants intended
to move for a new trial, but so far as the record discloses,
that intention was not carried into fruitition. Until the
entry of the final judgment it was the duty of the plaintiffs
to go forward. When final judgment was entered in favor
of the plaintiffs, that duty shifted to the defendants, if they
desired further relief of the court. They notified the court
of their intention to ask further relief and there the
matter rested. Plaintiffs respectfully urge that by their
inaction, the defendants abandoned their motion; if by any
stretch of the imagination the instrument can be deemed a
motion. Now it is conceded that plaintiffs could have called
up the said "Notice of Intention to Move for a New Trial"
for hearing, but that was not plaintiffs' responsibility. Plaintiffs had received from the court all that they requested.
No longer was it their responsibility to move forward, and
the defendants did not move forward but apparently abandoned any original intent to ask for further relief from the
court. It is npt at all uncommon for persons having legal
rights, to fail to press those rights, particularly where the
rights are questionable; and it is a common rule of law
that if a claim is not pressed aggressively, the right to do so
will be lost. Defendants' failure to press the matter for a
period of fifteen months after judgment against them, is
more than ample time to justify the court in ignoring or
dismissing the so-called motion, if there is any motion before
the court. In Darke v. Ireland, 4 Utah 192 (196), the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah said:
"It appears from the record that on June 20, 1883,
26 days after the date of the judgment and during
the term in which it was rendered, plaintiff filed an
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affidavit in which he stated certain reasons for a new
trial. And on the 27th day of the same month, this
affidavit appears to have been served on defendant.
This is all that appears on the record with respect to
the motion. The plaintiff urges that the effect of the
steps toward a motion for a new trial was to retain
jurisdiction in the courts over the case for the purpose
of the motion to vacate the judgment. No such notice
of motion as is required by Section 1420 of the
Compiled Laws of Utah 1876 was given. The failure
to comply with the law with respect to the motion,
with the further fact that no notice appears to have
been taken of it by the court or counsel, authorized the
inference that the motion for a new trial was abandoned."
It should be noted that in the Darke case there is
nothing indicating abandonment other than the failure to
give the notice required by Section 1420. The moving party
merely let the matter rest for a period of 13 months and
because it was the duty of the moving party to go forward,
the court implied an abandonment. In that case the period
of failure to press the matter was less than in the case now
before the court. At the time the Darke case, supra, was
heard, the laws granted far greater time within which acts
were to be performed. But in that case failure for 13 months
to call up the motion for new trial was considered to be an
abandonment. The Darke case has never been overruled
nor modified and stands now as precedent that a motion for
new trial, if not called to the attention of the court for
action within a 13 months' period, may be ignored and considered as abandoned.
Point 5. THAT THE PURPORTED FINDINGS OF THE
COURT IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED MARCH
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9, 1960, IN CIVIL NO. 123132, THAT THE MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL IN CASE NO. 108689 IS VALID AND
THE TIME FOR APPEAL HAS NOT EXPIRED, IS NULL
AND VOID, FOR THE REASON THAT CASE NO.
123132 HAVING BEEN DISMISSED THERE IS NOTHING BEFORE THE COURT ON WHICH IT CAN BASE A
FINDING THAT THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, SOCALLED, IS VALID.
The court in the summary judgment rendered March 9,
1960, (Record 32) dismissed plaintiffs' case for "no cause
for action." Thereafter, it purports to adjudicate the case
on the merits. That it cannot do. Once having dismissed
the case, there is nothing before the court on which it can
act. No affirmative request for relief was filed by the defendants, by way of counterclaim or cross-complaint, and
once the matter is dismissed as "no cause of action" the
plaintiffs could, unless the dismissal was with prejudice,
as is not the case here, commence a new action for determination of the points in litigation. The District Court could not
after the dismissal proceed to adjudicate those points.

CONCLUSIONS
It is the contention of the plaintiffs herein that the
defendants failed to file and serve such a motion as is
required by Rule 6 (d), Rule 7 (b) (I), and Rule 59, and
that no n1otion effective to stay the running of the time
for appeal having been filed and the period for appeal having expired, the district court and the supreme
court are without jurisdiction to modify the judgment
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in any way or to vacate or modify or rehear the judgment.
Plaintiffs respectfully urge that the matters herein set
forth are jurisdictional and not merely procedural; nor
are they matters of discretion. The defendant not having
made a motion, but only having expressed an intention, and
not having given notice thereof as required by the rules, the
essential machinery for staying the period of appeal was not
' set in motion and after the expiration of the period for
appeal, the court lost all jurisdiction over the case.
In National Popsicle Corp. v. Hughes, 32 Fed. Supp.
399, the court said:
"It would be contrary to sound reasoning, as well as
settled principles of federal law, to construe Rule 6
(c) to mean that the court has continuing jurisdiction
over its final judgments and decrees. The power of
the court over its final judgments must end some
time. If the period of termination is specified in the
Rules of Civil Procedure that period governs. Otherwise the end of the term marks the termination of
the court's power, in accordance with settled law."
Moore, in commenting on the federal rules, as amended,
including the 1939, 1946, and 1948 amendments, has this
to say in commenting on rule 73, dealing with appeals.
"The second sentence of the amended rule deals
with this problem. It should be noted that the time
for appeal is terminated only by a timely motion
made for judgment n. o. v. under rule 50 (b), or to
amend or make additional findings under rule 52
(b), or for a new trial under rule 59 (b), or to alter
or amend the judgment under rule 59 (e) ; to be
timely a motion under rule 52 (b), 59 (b), or 59 (e)
must be made not later than ten days after the entry
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of judgment. And a motion for judgment n. o. v.
under rule 50 (b) must be made within ten days after
the reception of a verdict or if a verdict is not returned within ten days after the jury has been discharged.
"In general, then, ~II of these rules provide for
a very short time, a ten-day period.
"It should be recalled that under rule 6 (b) as
amended, the court may not enlarge any of these
time periods. This changes the former practice, since
under the original rule 6 (d) the only express limitation upon the court's power to enlarge any of these
time periods was a prohibition against enlarging the
time for moving for a new trial under rule 59."
Moore's Federal Rules and Official Forms, page
1210.
In further support of plaintiffs' contention that the problem here involved is jurisdictional, plaintiffs quote further
from Moore:
"In ordinary civil actions governed by the federal
rules of civil procedure, however, the better view is
that when the ·time limits prescribed in the rules expire, the court loses its jurisdiction to entertain a
motion as for new trial, or for a rehearing, or to
vacate or amend, as the case may be, and cannot
thereafter entertain such a motion and thereby start
the appeal time running anew. Safeway Stores, Inc.
v. Coe (Appellate D.C. 1943) 136 F 2d 771; Jusino
v. Moreles & Tio (CCA lst, 1955); 139 F 2d 946;
Nealon v. Hill (CCA 9th 1945); 149 F 2d 883; Norris v. Kemp (CCA lOth, 1944) 144 R 2d 1." Moore's
Federal Rules and Official Forms, pages 1210 and
1211.
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There is a recent federal case quite closely in point
on this entire problem. It is entitled Raughley v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. and is a decision of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, decided Feb. 7, 1956 and reported in
230 F 2d 387. In that case the losing attorney requested the
court for re-argument so that a question not previously presented might be argued:
"At the judge's request the narrative runs, counsel
left a memorandum of his authorities with the judge's
secretary for examination. On January 3, 1955
counsel was informed by the court that reargument
would be allowed and it was, as the docket entries
show."
The re-argument was allowed and the court made an order
denying the motion for re-argument. The losing party
forthwith appealed and the question was whether the appeal
was timely. The Circuit Court held that the trial court
was without authority to enlarge the time, that the motion
made, even though heard and ruled on by the court, did not
comply with the provisions of Rule 7 (b) and:
"cannot be considered as a motion under the other
rules."
Because the motion was defective the appeal came too late
and motion to dismiss the appeal was granted. It is respectfully submitted that in the case now before the court
we have a written "Notice of Intent to Move for a New
Trial" but no motion. Neither is the notice appended
thereto, as required by Rule 6 (d) and as set forth in Form
20 nor does the instrument meet the requirements of a
motion as required by Rule 7 (b); and its is plaintiffs'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
contention that the instrument was therefore insufficient
to comply with the rules and did not in the least degree
follow Form 20. And being insufficient to suspend the
running of the time for appeal, the rule in Raughley v.
Pennsylvania RR should be followed. It is further contended that even if the court should now hear and pass on
defendants' "Notice of Intention," thereby regarding the document as a motion, this would not cure the defect because
the court i8 without jurisdiction so to do. The court in the
Raughley case just quoted, did exactly that, but the Circuit
Court of Appeals held:
"Now is there any way in which such a motion, even
though not timely made, can still have the effect of
tolling the period for appeal? Specifically, did the
court below produce such an effect by entertaining
and ruling (on May 12th on appellants' motion of
January 4th). It should be noted that the motion
of January 4th was timely in that it was within the
ten-day period, but it was not timely because not in
proper form."
The court discusses the problem further and concludes:
"The action of the trial court here in regards to the
motion of January 4th must therefore be regarded
. ''
as a nuIIIty.
The ruling of the court in the Raughley case to the effect that
a defective motion, even though made within the ten day
period, and even though acted upon, is not sufficient to stay
the running of the appeal period, squarely suports plaintiffs'
position. Adopting the language of the court in US of A
vs. 64.88 Acres etc., supra. To regard the instant motion
as sufficient to stay the running of the time for appeal is
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to nullify completely Rule 6 (d) and Rule 7 (b). If the
Supreme Court should rule that compliance with these
rules is not mandatory then it will, at the same time, cast
doubt upon all the rules and we shall be left without guidance
In conducting litigation.
It is respectfully urged that the court erred in granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment. This decision
of the district court should he reversed and the court should
be instructed to grant plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment, affirming the validity of the judgment of July 9,
1958, in Civil No. 108689.
Respectfully submitted,
PERRIS S. JENSEN

Attorney for Plaintiffs
1414 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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